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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀect of leniency programs on the stability of cartels under two
diﬀerent regimes of ﬁnes, ﬁxed and proportional. We analyze the design of self-reporting
incentives, having a group of defendants. Moreover, we consider a dynamic setup, where
accumulated (not instantaneous) beneﬁts and losses from crime are taken into account.
We obtain that cartel occurrence is less likely if the rules of the leniency programs are
more strict and the procedure of application for leniency is more conﬁdential. Moreover, we
conclude that, when the procedure of application for leniency is not conﬁdential and penal-
ties and rate of law enforcement are low, leniency may increase duration of cartel agreements.
Surprisingly, under a ﬁxed penalty scheme the introduction of a leniency program cannot
improve the eﬀectiveness of antitrust enforcement when the procedure of application for
leniency is not conﬁdential.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: K21, L41.
Keywords: Antitrust Policy, Antitrust Law, Self-reporting, Leniency Programs.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper analyses the eﬀects of leniency programs by employing a game between two ﬁrms,
which participate in a cartel agreement and decide on the optimal time of revealing the informa-
tion about the cartel to the antitrust authority. The enforcement problem we study has several
ingredients. Firstly, we analyze the design of self-reporting schemes, where we have a group and
not a single defendant. Secondly, we consider a dynamic set-up, where accumulated beneﬁts
and losses from crime are taken into account. Leniency programs allow for complete or partial
exemption from the ﬁne for ﬁrms, who reveal information about the cartel to the antitrust
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discussions and valuable comments.
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1authority. It is intuitively clear that a legally sanctioned opportunity for costless self-reporting
changes the nature of the game played between the antitrust authority and the group of ﬁrms.
To analyze the impact of this opportunity on cartel stability we apply tools of timing games.
In particular, we study a dynamic game of the preemption type.
Leniency programs have been recently introduced in the European antitrust legislation and
have quite a long history in the US. ”Leniency programs” grant total or partial immunity from
ﬁnes to ﬁrms that collaborate with the authorities. To be more precise, leniency is deﬁned as a
r e d u c t i o no ft h eﬁne for the ﬁrms, which cooperate with antitrust authorities by revealing the
information about the existence of cartel before the investigation has started, or that provide
additional information that can help to speed up the investigation. The leniency programs work
on the principle that ﬁrms, who break the law, might report their crimes or illegal activities if
given proper incentives.
In the US the ﬁrst Corporate Leniency Program was introduced in 1978. Then it was
reﬁned and extended in August 1993. Later the Antitrust Division of the US Department of
Justice revised its Corporate Leniency Program to make it easier for and more attractive to
companies to come forward and cooperate with the Division1. Three major revisions were made
to the program, namely, amnesty is automatic if there is no pre-existing investigation, amnesty
may still be available even if cooperation begins after the investigation is underway, and all
oﬃcers, directors, and employees who cooperate are protected from criminal prosecution. As
a result of these changes, the Amnesty Program is the Division’s most eﬀective generator of
international cartel cases. Moreover, the revised Corporate Amnesty Program has resulted in
a surge in amnesty applications. Under the old amnesty policy the Division obtained roughly
one amnesty application per year. Under the new policy, the application rate has been more
than one per month. In the last few years, cooperation from amnesty applications resulted in
scores of convictions of over $1 billion in ﬁnes2.
In Europe the ﬁrst Leniency Programs were introduced in 1996. The modiﬁed Leniency
program introduced by the EC in 2002 gives complete immunity from ﬁnes to ﬁrms which
were the ﬁrst to submit evidence about the cartel to the antitrust authority. Moreover, partial
reduction of ﬁnes (approximately by 50%) should take place even if ﬁrms reveal information
1Spratling Gray R. (Deputy assistant Attorney, Antitrust Division, US Dept. of Justice). "The corporate
leniency policy: Answers to Recurring Questions", presented at the Spring 1998 ABA Meeting (Antitrust section),
available for download at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1626.htm
2OECD report 2002, ”Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Core Cartels and Sanctions Against Cartels.”
2after an investigation has started. Similar programs have been introduced in 2002 in the UK
and other European countries.
There is some empirical evidence that Leniency programs improve welfare by sharply in-
creasing the probability of interrupting collusive practices and by shortening the investigation.
In the US, for example, the increase of the ﬁnes collected in 1993 almost doubled the ones in
1992, which can be connected with the major modiﬁcation of leniency programs. However,
there are also other eﬀects of leniency programs, which are now diﬃcult to identify in empirical
studies due to the absence of data. For example, the answer to the questions of how introduc-
tion of leniency programs would inﬂuence cartel stability and duration of cartel agreement, or
whether leniency facilitates collusion or reduces it, still require deeper investigation. In this
paper we give some insights into the analysis of these problems.
This problem also falls into a wider class of models, which analyze optimal policies for the
deterrence of violations of antitrust law in the presence of leniency schemes, such as Motta and
Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2000), Malik (1993) or Hinloopen (2003). In particular, we study the
problem of how an additional enforcement instrument, such as a leniency program, inﬂuences
the stability of cartels under two diﬀerent regimes of ﬁnes, ﬁxed and proportional. Most papers
on leniency employ a discrete time framework. However, proportional penalty schemes that
most closely reﬂect current antitrust rules were not analyzed in the discrete time repeated
games models so far. We analyze setting with proportional penalty scheme using continuous
time dynamic game, where we model accumulated gains from price-ﬁxing as a state variable.
For this reason we investigate intertemporal aspects of this problem using dynamic optimal
stopping models and tools of dynamic continuous time preemption games. In this way we
extend the existing literature.
It should be stressed that a legally sanctioned opportunity for costless whistle-blowing
changes the game played between the antitrust authority and the group of ﬁrms, compared
to a setting where leniency is not available. Intuitively, this opportunity should reduce cartel
stability and increase the incentives for ﬁrms to reveal the cartel. In this paper we investigate
the eﬀects of the leniency programs on the behavior of the ﬁrms participating in price-ﬁxing
agreements. The main ﬁnding of the paper is that well designed leniency may reduce duration
of cartel agreements but this result is not unambiguous. Under strict antitrust enforcement,
when penalties and the rate of law enforcement are high, the possibility to self-report and be
exempted from the ﬁne increases the incentives for the ﬁrms to stop cartel formation, and,
hence, reduces the duration of cartels. However, when the procedure of application for leniency
3is not conﬁdential and penalties and rate of law enforcement are low, introduction of leniency
programs may, on the contrary, facilitate collusion. Under a ﬁx e dp e n a l t ys c h e m e ,e v e ni nt h e
presence of leniency, the eﬃciency of cartel deterrence (in terms of redaction of duration of car-
tel agreements) depends only on the amount of the ﬁne and the probability of law enforcement.
We show that ”too lenient ” leniency programs may also facilitate collusion, when penalties are
ﬁxed and fall below a certain threshold.
We distinguish two regimes with respect to the rules of leniency programs and application
procedure. The ﬁrst regime corresponds to more strict enforcement, i.e. only the ﬁrm, which
is the ﬁrst to self-reports, is eligible for complete exemption from the ﬁne and the application
procedure is strictly conﬁdential. The second ﬁrm bears either the full ﬁne or, if it provides
suﬃcient evidence, it can be exempted from up to 50% of the ﬁne. This set up most closely re-
ﬂects the rules of current guidelines for reduction of ﬁnes for ﬁrms that cooperate with antitrust
authorities and reveal information about existing cartels3. The second regime corresponds to
the case where the rules of antitrust enforcement are not too strict (more lenient). In this
case also the ﬁrm, which is the second to self-report, obtains partial exemption from the ﬁne.
Moreover, the antitrust authority makes the application procedure publicly observable. Com-
parison of these two regimes implies that, if the rules of leniency programs and the procedure
of application for leniency are more strict, cartel occurrence is less likely.
A number of earlier papers have studied the problem of self-reporting. Malik (1993) and
Kaplow and Shavell (1994) were the ﬁrst to identify the potential beneﬁts of schemes which
elicit self-reporting by violators. They conclude that self-reporting may reduce enforcement
costs and improve risk-sharing, as risk-averse self-reporting individuals face a certain penalty
rather than the stochastic penalty faced by non-reporting violators. A similar paper in this
ﬁeld is Innes (1999), who considers an extension of environmental self-reporting schemes.
The use of leniency programs in antitrust has been extensively studied by Motta and Polo
(2003). They show that such programs might have an important role in the prosecution of
cartels provided that ﬁrms can apply for leniency after an investigation has started. They
conclude that, if given the possibility to apply for leniency, the ﬁrm might well decide to give
up its participation in the cartel in the ﬁrst place. They also ﬁnd that leniency saves resources
for the authority. Finally, their formal analysis shows that leniency should only be used when
the antitrust authority has limited resources, so that a leniency program is not unambiguously
optimal. The paper by Motta and Polo (2003) is closely related to the paper by Spagnolo
3See OECD report (2002).
4(2000). He shows that only courageous leniency programs that reward self-reporting parties
may completely and costlessly deter collusion, while moderate leniency programs that reduce
or cancel sanctions for the reporting party cannot aﬀect organized crime.
A next attempt to study the eﬃciency of leniency programs in antitrust enforcement was
made in Feess and Walzl (2003). They developed a model to analyze and compare leniency
programs in the EU and the USA. For that purpose they constructed a stage-game with two
self-reporting stages, heterogeneous types with respect to the amount of evidence provided, and
ex post asymmetric information; and solve it by backward induction. Their analysis shows that
self-reporting schemes are much more promising for criminal teams than for single violators,
since strategic interactions between team members lead to increased expected ﬁnes, and reduce
the frequency of violations. Hence, their model once again conﬁrms the eﬀectiveness of leniency
programs in the ﬁght against cartels.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. In section 3 we
consider the decision of a single ﬁrm, which participates in a cartel agreement, about the
optimal stopping time, i.e. the moment of revelation of information about the violation to the
authority in the absence of leniency programs. Further, in section 4 we introduce more players
and study a timing game with two identical ﬁrms forming the cartel after leniency programs are
introduced. In this part we suggest a new approach to the problem of the analysis of eﬃciency
of the leniency programs that diﬀers from the earlier papers by Motta and Polo (2003) or
Feess and Walzl (2003) and that is based on the Reiganum-Fudenberg-Tirole Model. Reiganum
(1981) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) have applied timing games to a technology adoption
process. We apply a similar procedure to a cartel formation between two ﬁrms in the presence
of a leniency program. Section 5 analyses the eﬀects of leniency when the leniency program
is less strict. Section 6 deals with the extension of the model of section 4 where we study the
eﬀects of a leniency program in the model of dynamic price competition and tacit collusion.
The last section summarizes the results and suggests directions for future work.
2 Optimal stopping model. The general setup.
We introduce the basic ingredients of the intertemporal optimization problem of an expected
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm, which participates in an illegal cartel. The key variable is the accumu-
lated gains from prior criminal oﬀences, w(t), (in case of a cartel, these oﬀences are price-ﬁxing
activities). Further we will call w(t) the value of collusion.
5Let us consider an industry with 2 symmetric ﬁrms engaged in a price-ﬁxing agreement.
Assume that they can agree and increase prices from pc = c to pm >ceach, where c is the
constant marginal cost in the industry. Since ﬁrms are symmetric, each of them has equal weight
in the coalition and, consequently, total cartel proﬁts will be divided equally among them. In a
game theoretic model we assume that there is a possibility of strategic interaction between the
ﬁrms in the coalition in the sense that they can break the cartel agreement by self-reporting.
By doing this we allow for the possibility for the ﬁrms to betray the cartel and this inﬂuences
the internal stability of the cartel.
The instantaneous monopoly proﬁt in the industry under consideration is denoted by πm.
Consequently, since the ﬁrms are assumed to be symmetric, the instantaneous proﬁtp e rﬁrm
will be πm
2 .
We consider two cases: the case where the penalty, s, is constant over time, i.e. s(t)=Fn,
and the case where the penalty is a fraction of the accumulated gains from price-ﬁxing activities
for the ﬁrms. In the latter case the penalty is represented by the expression s(t)=αw(t), where
α is the scale parameter of the penalty scheme. This setup will also allow us to compare the
eﬃciency of ﬁxed and proportional penalty schemes. Both of them are currently used in the
sentencing guidelines of diﬀerent countries4.
The main feature of a leniency program is the reduction of the ﬁne (or complete exemption
from the ﬁne) for the ﬁrm that ﬁrst reveals the information about the existence of the cartel.
To be more precise, in the model we assume the following set-up. If one of the ﬁrms reports the
cartel, then this ﬁrm pays no ﬁne, sL =0 , while the other ﬁrm will pay the normal ﬁne, sn,t h a t
(according to current sentencing guidelines for violations of antitrust law) can be approximated
by the amount of 10% of overall turnover of the enterprise. The current rules also imply that, if
the second ﬁrm decides to cooperate before the investigation is completed, the ﬁne for this ﬁrm
will be reduced by approximately 25%, sF =0 .75sn (or 0.75 ∗ 10% of overall turnover of the
enterprise). Moreover, if both ﬁrms report the cartel simultaneously, then each of them pays
the reduced ﬁne, sM =0 .5sn. These rules are roughly consistent with partial immunity clauses
that often apply if more than one cartelist reports5.
The rate of law enforcement by the antitrust authority equals λ ∈ (0,1]. This variable
4OECD report 2002, ”Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Core Cartels and Sanctions Against Cartels.”
5Moreover, Apesteguia, Dufwenberg and Selten (2003) use a similar mechanism to design one of the treatments
in their experimental paper, which studies the eﬀects of leniency on the stability of a cartel. Feess and Walzl
(2003) also consider partial reduction of ﬁnes for both ﬁrms in case of simultaneous self-reporting.
6denotes the instantaneous probability that the ﬁrm is checked by antitrust authority and found
guilty.
Given this set-up, ﬁrms, participating in the cartel agreement, decide on the optimal stop-
ping time, i.e. the moment of revelation of information about the violation to the authority. An
alternative way of stopping may be described in terms of quitting the cartel without reporting
to the antitrust authority. We assume that, after the cartel has been discovered either due to
eﬀorts of antitrust authority or due to self-reporting by one or both ﬁrms, collusion stops forever
and, consequently, the stream of illegal gains also stops. Basically, ﬁrms would not renew the
agreement, if one of them betrayed the other.
The expected penalty if the ﬁrm, which was participating in the cartel, is caught at date t
is given by λs(t). The discount rate is denoted by r.T h ev a l u ef o rt h eﬁrm from revealing the
cartel at time t is V (t). This variable also can be considered as an option value of self-reporting.
We assume that there are two identical ﬁrms that form a cartel. The inﬁnite planning horizon
is considered, on which the risk-neutral ﬁrms maximize their value at discount rate r (> 0).
3 Benchmark. Optimal stopping model without leniency.
To study the eﬀects of leniency programs on cartel stability, we ﬁrst consider the benchmark
case, where leniency is not available, i.e. the ﬁrms act without taking into account the possibility
of self-reporting. Basically, in this case we consider an optimal stopping model with a single
decision maker, where the representative ﬁrm maximizes its expected gains from price-ﬁxing
with respect to time. Second, in section 4 we move to the setting where the antitrust authority
introduces leniency. In that case the dynamic interactions between two ﬁrms, which form a
cartel but can also betray it, are modelled by employing tools of preemption games.
In the deterministic case the value of collusion changes according to the following law:
dw = πm




2 e−rsds = πm
2r (1 − e−rt)
The value of stopping the cartel at time T, St(T), is determined as an integral over time
of instantaneous expected gains from collusion before time T. It should be positively related
to the instantaneous proﬁts from price-ﬁxing before reporting, πm
2 , and negatively related to
the instantaneous expected penalty, λs(t). We assume that cartel formation stops only in case
when ﬁrms decide to quit the cartel or self-report to the antitrust authority. While ﬁrms always
renew collusive agreement after they are caught and punished by antitrust authority without
cooperation of cartel members. So the value of stopping the cartel for each ﬁrm in the absence








In case the ﬁne is proportional to the accumulated illegal gains from price-ﬁxing, expression














To ﬁnd the optimal time of stopping cartel, we diﬀerentiate (2) with respect to T and obtain
∂F(w)
∂T = πm
2 e−rT − αλπm
4r e−rT + αλπm
4r e−2rT =0 .
This implies that the optimal stopping time for the single ﬁrm, which takes a decision






This result also coincides with the solution of the dynamic game , where 2 symmetric ﬁrms
choose whether to stop or continue cartel at each instant of time. Using the backward induction
argument and assuming that in case of multiple equilibria ﬁrms choose for the equilibrium with
the highest payoﬀ, we obtain that the game stops at T∗, when both ﬁrms decide to quit the
cartel simultaneously.
The expression (3) shows that the optimal time of stopping the cartel decreases when either
the probability or the severity of punishment increases. The higher the expected penalty, the
earlier the ﬁrm decides to quit the cartel agreement, since ∂T∗
∂α < 0 and ∂T∗
∂λ < 0 .
4 Preemption game with leniency
Now we describe a timing game of the preemption type played between two symmetric ﬁrms.
The leader in this game (i.e., the ﬁrm which is the ﬁrst to self-report) has the advantage of
complete exemption from the ﬁne, i.e. sL =0 . Moreover, since ﬁrms are identical it seems
natural to consider symmetric strategies.
First, we consider a setting where ﬁrms cannot respond immediately to the actions of their
rivals. Following the rules of application for leniency currently used by most antitrust author-
ities, the information about applications is kept conﬁdential. This information normally does
8not become public knowledge immediately after the ﬁrm has applied for leniency. That is why
in this section we analyze a setting where it is not possible to react instantaneously. The ﬁrm,
w h i c hs e l f - r e p o r t sa ss e c o n d ,c a nb ee x e m p t e do n l yf o rl e s st h a n5 0 %o ft h eﬁne, while the
leader gets complete immunity from ﬁne.
N e x t ,i ns e c t i o n5w ec o m p a r et h er e g i m ed e s c r i b e da b o v ew i t ht h ec a s ew h e r et h er u l e so f
leniency programs are less strict and the procedure of application for leniency is less conﬁdential.
We model this by relaxing the assumption that instantaneous reaction is not possible. That
is, we consider a setting where ﬁrms can respond immediately to their rival’s decisions. This
implies that actions of the ﬁrms are perfectly observable and the procedure of self-reporting
is instantaneous (does not take any time). Clearly, in this case simultaneous self reporting is
possible. However, this could be a too strong assumption for the model that describes leniency
programs, since the procedure of application for leniency in most cases is very conﬁdential. But
we consider it in order to compare the results of these two regimes and show that if the rules of
leniency programs and the procedure of application for leniency were more strict, cartels would
be less likely.
In general, the game we are going to study, is a continuous time preemption game, and,
we use the feedback equilibrium solution concept in order to solve it. First, we determine the
objective functions of both players in case there is a ﬁrst mover (leader) and a second mover
(follower), and in case of simultaneous self-reporting. Next, we ﬁnd optimal stopping times for
each case. Finally, we derive the feedback equilibrium of the preemption game with leniency.
We assume that after the ﬁrst ﬁrm has reported about the existence of the cartel to the
authority, the cartel stops, and consequently, the stream of illegal gains also stops. In case of
complete information about the actions of the rival the best response of the second ﬁrm would
be to cooperate and reveal the cartel immediately after the ﬁrst ﬁrm (the leader) does so. In
other words, our approach represents a quite extreme form of preemption in that the follower
ﬁrm loses entirely its chance to be completely exempted from the ﬁne if it is forestalled by the
leader. In the general setting the leader reports at the same time or before the follower, i.e.
0 ≤ TL ≤ TF. Where TL and TF are the optimal stopping times for the leader and follower,
respectively. Given the times TL and TF, and due to the special structure of the game, the value
of the leader equals the integral over time of the instantaneous illegal gains from price-ﬁxing,
πm
2 , less the instantaneous expected penalty, λs(t). The additional term −sLe−rTL reﬂects the
discounted value of the ﬁne that has to be paid by the leader after the cartel is discovered due
to self-reporting. By construction of the game this value equals zero. So, the value of the leader













− λs(t))e−rtdt − 0. (4)
After time TL , i.e. after the cartel was reported to the authority, the ﬂow of illicit
gains stops, so the exact value of TF is not relevant for the determination of VL(TL,T F) and
VF(TL,T F).
In the same way the value of the follower, VF(TL,T F), can be derived. The follower value is
given by the integral over time of the instantaneous illegal gains from price-ﬁxing, πm
2 ,l e s st h e
instantaneous expected penalty, λs(t). The term −sn(TL)e−rTL reﬂects the discounted value of
the normal (full) ﬁne that has to be paid by the follower after the cartel is discovered6. Hence,







− λs(t))e−rtdt − sF(TL)e−rTL = VL(TL,T F) − sn(TL)e−rTL. (5)
Similarly, the value of the ﬁrm in case of simultaneous self-reporting is determined by











sn(Tc)e−rTc, iﬀ TL = TF. (6)
Since ﬁrms are completely symmetric and the ﬂow of illicit gains stops after one of the
ﬁrms reports, it is not essential to distinguish between the follower and the leader. Hence,
in order to emphasize symmetry, we call them further ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2. First, we deﬁne
T∗
c =a r gm a x Tc VM(Tc,T c) and T∗
L =a r gm a x T1 :( T1≤T2) VL(T1,T 2). Note also that VL(T1,T 2)=
VM(T1,T 2),w h e nT1 = T2. From expressions (4) - (6) it is clear that VF(T1,T 2) ≤ VM(T1,T 2) <
VL(T1,T 2) for any T1 <T 2.
4.1 Conﬁdential Leniency Programs
In this subsection we analyze a model, where it is not possible for ﬁrms to react instantaneously
to the actions of their rivals, i.e. the rules and procedure of application for leniency are very
strict. This corresponds to the ﬁrst regime mentioned in the introduction of the paper, namely
t h er e g i m ew i t hm o r es t r i c te n f o r c e m e n t ,i . e .o n l yt h eﬁrm, which formally self-reports the ﬁrst
6Note that the results of the analysis below are valid for any s




10(even if second ﬁrm also does it voluntary), is eligible for complete exemption from the ﬁne.
The second ﬁrm bears the full ﬁne (even it is several seconds later to self-report than the ﬁrst
one), and the application procedure is strictly conﬁdential.
The objective functions of the ﬁrms can be described as follows. In a feedback equilibrium
the leader (ﬁrm 1) takes into account that its stopping decision aﬀects the decision of the
follower (ﬁrm 2). However, for this particular problem it holds that the decision of the follower
does not inﬂuence the value of the leader’s payoﬀ after he decides to reveal the cartel, see (4)
or (11). This implies that the expressions (7) and (8) below do not depend on reaction of the
follower.

























The function L(T) (F(T)) is equal to the expected discounted value at time t =0of the
leader (follower) when the leader reports at time T. M(T) is the discounted value at time t =0
of the ﬁrm when there is simultaneous self-reporting at time T7.
Here we assume that the ﬁrms can not react instantaneously, i.e. only a lagged reaction
is possible. The implication is that the payoﬀ of M(t) is no longer available for the follower.
Therefore, given the expressions (4), (5) and (6), in equilibrium the following inequalities hold
L(t) >M(t) >F(t) for all t∈ (0,∞) (10)
Note that L(0) = F(0) = M(0). Furthermore, π denotes the proﬁts of an inﬁnitely lasing
cartel.
To ﬁnd feedback equilibria of this model we consider the dynamic timing game. At each
instant of time t the following simultaneous move matrix game is played (see table 1 below):




n(T)]. Which is in line
with current leniency rules (see OECD report 2002).
11Self-report Not self-report
Self-report (M(t),M(t)) (L(t),F(t))
Not self-report (F(t),L(t)) repeat game
Table 1.P a y o ﬀs and strategies of matrix game played at time t.
We also denote by π the value of the inﬁnitely lasting cartel. In case of proportional penalty





T h eg a m ei sp l a y e da tt i m et if no ﬁrm has reported about the existence of the cartel so
far. Playing the game costs no time and if ﬁrm 1 chooses row 2 and ﬁrm 2 column 2 the
game is repeated. If necessary the game will be repeated inﬁnitely many times. Clearly, in this
matrix game the outcomes, which are simultaneous self-reporting by both ﬁrms - (S,S) and the
decision not to reveal the cartel by both players - (N,N), c a na r i s ea saN a s hE q u i l i b r i ai np u r e
strategies. The result depends on the magnitude of the maximal simultaneous self-reporting
v a l u ea n dt h ev a l u eo ft h ep r o ﬁts in case of inﬁnitely lasting cartel formation.
The result of this analysis suggests that after introduction of leniency programs antitrust
enforcement appears to be more eﬃcient than in the absence of leniency. Even in combination
with moderate penalties it leads to immediate self-reporting by both ﬁrms in the beginning of
the game. Depending on the severity of punishment, two possible outcomes can arise. Either
both ﬁrms report the cartel simultaneously in the beginning of the game, or the cartel can last
forever. The results of the analysis in the setting with proportional penalty are summarized in
the next proposition. Later, in section 6 of the paper, we compare these results to the solution
of the model with ﬁxed penalty.
Proposition 1 For setting with proportional penalty, the outcome of the game with leniency,
where ﬁrms cannot react instantaneously to the actions of their rivals, is
immediate simultaneous self-reporting, i.e. (t∗
1,t ∗
2)=( 0 ,0), if αλ > r,
or cartel forever, i.e. (t∗
1,t ∗
2)=( ∞,∞), if αλ < r.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Let us compare this result with the conclusion of the model, where ﬁrms take decisions
in the absence of leniency programs. Recall that from expression (3) we obtain that if the
optimal stopping time of the model without leniency (T∗) exists, then T∗ > 0 for any values of
parameters of the model (α ∈ (0,∞),λ∈ (0,1],r∈ (0,1] such that αλ > r), since expression
αλ
αλ−r is always greater than one, when αλ > r. In the game with leniency we have immediate
12self-reporting by both ﬁrms in the beginning of the game, when αλ > r. This result suggests
that antitrust enforcement after introduction of leniency programs is more eﬃc i e n tt h a ni nt h e
absence of leniency. Hence, strictly conﬁdential leniency programs improve upon the situation
without leniency.
5N o n - c o n ﬁdential leniency programs
In this section we discuss the preemption game with leniency under the assumption that ﬁrms
can react instantaneously to the actions of their rivals. In particular, this implies that here we
study the second regime, mentioned in the introduction, namely where the rules of antitrust
enforcement are not too strict and the procedure of application for leniency is less conﬁdential.
First, we determine the objective functions of both players in case there is a ﬁrst mover
(leader) and a second mover (follower), and in case of simultaneous self-reporting for propor-
tional penalty setting. Next, we ﬁnd optimal stopping times for each case. Finally, we derive
the feedback equilibrium of the preemption game with leniency under the assumption that
instantaneous reaction is possible.
Now, we describe in more detail the derivation of the optimal stopping times for the leader
and in case of simultaneous self-reporting, TL and Tc , in a setting where the penalty is
proportional to the amount of illicit gains, i.e. s(t)=αw(t) for all t ∈ [0,∞).
















− λαw(t))e−rtdt − αw(T)e−rT. (12)















2 e−rsds, w(0) = 0.T c deﬁnes optimal time of simultaneous self-reporting and
TL(TF) optimal time of self-reporting by leader (follower).
13Following the benchmark model, taking the derivative of (11)w i t hr e s p e c tt oT and equal-






= T∗ =a r gm a x
T
St(T) (14)
The necessary condition for a maximum is satisﬁed since
∂L2(TL)
∂2T < 0.
From expression (14) we obtain, that the earliest time of revelation (i.e. breaking the cartel
agreement) by one of the ﬁrms will decrease when either α or λ increases. This result is quite
intuitive, because it means that the cartel stability should be reduced when either severity or
probability of punishment increases. At the same time, the eﬀect of an increase in the discount
rate on the optimal time of self reporting gives ∂TL
∂r < 0. Hence, the ﬁrms will ﬁnd it more
attractive to stop earlier if the discount rate is higher, since future illicit gains become less
valuable.
Similarly to the above analysis we take the derivative of (13) with respect to T and equalize
it to zero. In this way we obtain the optimal stopping time in case both ﬁrms report the cartel







The necessary condition for the existence of maximum is satisﬁed since
∂M2(Tc)
∂2T < 0.
From this expression we obtain, that the earliest time of revelation (i.e. breaking the cartel
agreement) by both ﬁrms simultaneously will decrease (move closer to the origin) when either α
or λ increase. So, the cartel stability is lower when either severity or probability of punishment
increase.8
Moreover, the solution of this problem exists only when λ>r(i.e. the rate of law enforce-
ment is higher than the discount rate) and αλ >
r(2+α)
2 (i.e. the coeﬃcient of expected penalty
is greater than the sum of the discount rate and half of the product of the scale parameter and
discount rate)9. In other words, the expected penalty is high enough to outweigh the current
beneﬁts from crime compared to the future penalties. Comparison of expressions (14) and (15)
implies the following lemma.
8It also should be mentioned that ln(
2α(λ−r)
2αλ−2r−αr) > 0 only if α<2. For any α ≥ 2, we obtain ln(
2α(λ−r)
2αλ−2r−αr) ≤
0,c o n s e q u e n t l y , t
∗
c =0 , since feasible domain for tc ∈ [0,∞).
9Note, that αλ >
r(2+α)
2 implies αλ > r. Hence, existence of non-negative value for optimal stopping time of
simultaneous self-reporting in the presence of leniency implies existence of non-negative optimal stopping time
in case when leniency is not available.
14Lemma 2 Given λ>r and αλ >
r(2+α)
2 , there exist TL =a r gm a x T L(T)=T∗ =a r gm a x T
St(T) and Tc =a r gm a x T M(T) such that
T∗ <T c, when r<α λ<2r and T∗ >T c, when 2r<α λ .
Proof: See Appendix 2.
This result shows that, when the multiplier of the expected penalty is lower than twice the
discount rate, in the absence of leniency programs the ﬁrm stops cartel formation sooner than
in case of simultaneous self-reporting after introduction of leniency. And vice versa, when the
instantaneous expected penalty is high enough, the ﬁrm that decides about the optimal time of
quitting the cartel on its own, in the absence of leniency programs, will choose to report later
than in case the ﬁrms coordinate their actions after introduction of the leniency program. The
result of this lemma will also be used later when we consider the implications of the feedback
equilibrium of the preemption game with leniency.
5.1 Derivation of the Feedback Equilibrium
The above described preemption game has a special feature in that the leader payoﬀ is not
inﬂuenced by the decision of the follower. However, still in the feedback equilibrium the reaction
of the follower should inﬂuence the decision of the leader about optimal time of self-reporting.
The leader should take into account that the second ﬁrm can react instantaneously to the
actions of the leader. This implies that the second ﬁrm will choose the same action as the
leader at each instant of time due to the fact that its ﬁne will be halved in this way. Hence,
TF = TL for any TL ∈ [0,∞). This implies that the ﬁrm that moves ﬁrst maximizes the value
of simultaneous self reporting, M(T), at each instant of time. Hence, Tc =a r gm a x T≥0 M(T) ,
and TL =a r gm a x T≥0 L(T) and L(TL) >M(Tc).
Now we turn to the special case, where the penalty schedule is proportional. Due to the
assumptions of symmetry and the possibility of instantaneous reaction for the second ﬁrm,
from the expressions (11)-(13) it is clear that in equilibrium the following condition is satisﬁed
L(t∗)=F(t∗)=M(t∗).








Not SR (M(t∗),M(t∗)) repeat
15Table 2. Payoﬀs and strategies of matrix game played at time t under the assumption of
possibility of instantaneous reaction.
We also denote by π the value of the inﬁnitely lasting cartel. In case of proportional penalty





So (S,S) arises as a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of the matrix game described above
in case M(t∗) >π. On the other hand, (N,N) is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of this
matrix game in case π>M (t∗) or π>M (t) for all t ∈ [0,∞). Recall that the maximal payoﬀ




2 − λαw(t))e−rtdt − 1
2αw(t∗))e−rt∗
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Based on expressions (16) and (17) we conclude that π>M (t) for all t ∈ [0,∞) only in
case αλ < r + αr
2 . Hence, when αλ < r + αr
2 the unique SPNE of the game is (N,N)t for all
t ∈ [0,∞). This means that self-reporting is never optimal, because ﬁrms prefer to keep the
cartel forever. In this case, introduction of leniency programs does not have any eﬀect on cartel
stability.
To complete the analysis, we consider the setting where αλ > r + αr
2 . In this case, self-
reporting occurs at the moment, Tc ,w h e nM(t) reaches its maximum. Hence, the unique
SPNE of the game is to play (N,N)t for all t ∈ [0,T c) and to play (S,S)t when t = Tc. Hence,
the game stops after period Tc. In this case, introduction of leniency programs can inﬂuence
the cartel stability. We will study these eﬀects in more detail in the next proposition.
In case αλ > r + αr
2 , a c c o r d i n gt ol e m m a3t w op o s s i b l eo u t c o m e sc a na r i s e :T∗ <T c or
T∗ >T c. The ﬁrst inequality implies that the result, obtained in case we consider the game
with leniency, leads to a later time of self-reporting compared to the solution of the problem
of the individual decision maker when leniency is not available. And the latter case implies an
earlier stopping time after introduction of leniency. In both cases the result described in the
following proposition holds.






Proof: See Appendix 3.
16In short, the intuition behind the proof of this proposition is as follows. There exists a
continuum of simultaneous self-reporting equilibria, from which simultaneous self-reporting at
time t = Tc Pareto dominates all other equilibria. In this Pareto dominant equilibrium, ﬁrms
”tacitly cooperate” by keeping the cartel until time Tc and then reveal it simultaneously and
p a yh a l fo ft h eﬁne, which is most beneﬁc i a lf o rb o t ho ft h e m .
Clearly, in contrast with the benchmark case, in the preemption game, which takes into
account the possibility of leniency, the antitrust authority can inﬂuence the outcome of the
game, i.e. the decision about the time of breaking the cartel agreement by both ﬁrms, not
only by changing the ﬁne and the probability of law enforcement. The introduction of leniency
programs also appears to be an important factor that may either reduce cartel stability or
facilitate collusion.
The above result also states that in the model without possibility of instantaneous reaction,
leniency programs appear to be more eﬃcient, since they enforce immediate self-reporting for
lower expected ﬁnes compared to the model where instantaneous reaction is possible. Recall the
model without possibility of instantaneous reaction. There we get that self-reporting becomes
dominant strategy already when αλ > r. On the other hand, in the model, where instantaneous
reaction is possible, self-reporting becomes a dominant strategy only when αλ > r + αr
2 . This
comparison clearly gives the result of earlier self-reporting in case the rules are more strict, i.e.
there is no possibility of instantaneous reaction. This implies that the incentives for the ﬁrms
to break the cartel are stronger under the assumption that they cannot react instantaneously
to the actions of their rivals.
We conclude that if the rules of leniency programs were more strict and the procedure of
application for leniency was more conﬁdential, cartel occurrence would be less likely. This can
happen due to the fact that the absence of the possibility to react to the actions of a rival
instantaneously increases the expected future losses if the cartel is revealed, since the payoﬀ of
M(t) is no longer available for the follower.
5.2 Eﬀects of leniency programs in the model, where instantaneous reaction
is possible
The equilibrium of the game with leniency may lead to either earlier or later deterrence than
in case the ﬁrms take the decision about stopping cartel agreement in the absence of leniency
programs.
Earlier deterrence happens if 2r<α λ , while the result of later deterrence arises if r<
17αλ < 2r. A special case occurs when r>α λ .In this case maxima of M(t) and St(t) in the
positive orthant do not exist and M0(t) > 0 and St0(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞). Hence, the best
strategy is cartel forever, since self-reporting is never proﬁtable. This situation is depicted in
Figure 1.
Moreover, for any α ≥ 2 we obtain from expression (15) that Tc ≤ 0. This means that
cartel formation stops immediately, Tc =0 . I.e. in the equilibrium of preemption game with
leniency when instantaneous reaction is possible it is optimal for both ﬁrms to reveal the
cartel immediately after the introduction of the leniency program. So, we can conclude that,-
for proportional penalty similarly to ﬁxed penalty,- in combination with a strict enforcement
policy (when α is high, α ≥ 2) leniency programs appear to be quite eﬃcient. They allow to
achieve immediate deterrence.
If we compare the impact of the penalty of the form s(t)=αw(t) (with α ≥ 2) in the
absence of the leniency programs, we do not observe the outcome with complete deterrence in
the beginning of the planning horizon for any parameter values, whereas with the introduction
of leniency programs this result becomes unambiguous10.
Moreover, for any α<2, thus when penalties are low, introduction of leniency programs
does not lead to the outcome with immediate complete deterrence, since Tc > 0.
To illustrate the above analysis, in Figures 2 and 3 the two functions , M(t) and St(t),
are plotted for cases r<α λ<2r and 2r<α λ ,respectively. The solid lines correspond to
the value of stopping in situation without leniency, and the dotted line represents the value of
simultaneous self-reporting that is relevant value in the game with leniency where instantaneous
reaction is possible.
In case r<α λ<2r11, we obtain that Tc >T ∗, where Tc =a r g m a x t≥0 M(t) and
T∗ =a r gm a x t≥0 St(t). This implies that the result, obtained in case we consider equilibria of
the preemption game with leniency, leads to a later optimal stopping time. Hence, compared to
the benchmark case where no leniency is available, greater harm is done to the consumers. Re-
call that T∗ =a r gm a x t≥0 St(t) reﬂects the optimal time of stopping the cartel formation in the
benchmark model, where ﬁrms do not take strategic considerations into account, see expression
(3) in Section 3. So, the fact that the ﬁrms take into account the reaction of the other ﬁrm
clearly increases the stability of cartel for intermediate values of α and λ, i.e. r<α λ<2r,
compared to the optimum of a single decision maker in the situation without leniency. However,
10For complete derivation of this result see paper by Motchenkova and Kort (2003).
11S e eF i g u r e2 .
18in case 2r<α λ ,equilibrium of the game with leniency (Tc,T c) leads to an earlier stopping time
than in the benchmark model. In this case, see Figure 3, the solution of the game with leniency
clearly reduces duration of cartel agreement, since argmaxt≥0 M(t) < argmaxt≥0 St(t).











Figure 1: Graphs of π, St(t) and M(t) for case αλ < r. Parameter values are
α =1 .5,λ=0 .2,r=0 .1,πm =1 .











Figure 2: Graphs of St(t) and M(t) for case r<α λ<2r. Parameter values are
α =1 ,λ=0 .2,r=1 /8,πm =1 .












Figure 3: Graphs of St(t) and M(t) for case αλ > 2r. Parameter values are
α =1 .5,λ=0 .2,r=0 .1,πm =1
The main conclusion of the above analysis is that, when the procedure of application for
leniency is not conﬁdential, leniency may still reduce duration of cartel agreements, but not
in all cases. When penalties and rate of law enforcement are low, introduction of leniency
programs may, on the contrary, facilitate collusion.
6 Analysis of the model with ﬁxed penalty
6.1 Benchmark model without leniency
In case the penalty is ﬁxed the value of stopping the cartel formation is determined as in









In order to ﬁnd the optimal stopping time , i.e. the time of stopping the cartel agreement,
we maximize (18) with respect to time. This implies that the optimal time of quitting the cartel









So, we can conclude that, while taking the decision about the optimal time of quitting
the cartel agreement , the ﬁrm just compares expected beneﬁts from price-ﬁxing and expected
20punishment. Moreover, from expression (19) it follows that when the expected penalty is high
enough, i.e. λFn > πm
2 , cartel formation stops immediately at time zero.
Expression (19) shows that the optimal decision is either to stop collusion immediately or
never. The higher the expected penalty the more likely that cartel formation stops immediately.
On the other hand, the higher the illegal gains the more likely that the cartel will last forever.
6.2 Analysis of the game with leniency, where penalty is ﬁxed
6.2.1 Regime with conﬁdential procedure of application for leniency
Depending on the severity of punishment, two possible outcomes can arise in a feedback equi-
librium of preemption game with leniency where instantaneous reaction is not possible. Either
both ﬁrms report the cartel simultaneously in the beginning of the game or the cartel will last
forever.
Proposition 4 The feedback equilibria of the game, when penalty is ﬁxed and equals Fn,a r e
immediate simultaneous self-reporting, i.e. (t∗
1,t ∗
2)=( 0 ,0), if λF n > πm
2 or cartel forever, i.e.
(t∗
1,t ∗
2)=( ∞,∞), if λFn ≤ πm
2 .
We refrain from presenting the proof of proposition 4, since it is similar to the proof of
proposition 1 w i t han u m b e ro fs i m p l i ﬁcations.12 Clearly, in case, when ﬁrms cannot react
instantaneously to the actions of their rivals, under the ﬁxed penalty scheme the solution of the
game with leniency coincides with the outcome of the benchmark model, where leniency is not
available.
6.2.2 Non-conﬁdential procedure of application for leniency
In this subsection we consider situation with less strict leniency programs, where ﬁrms can
react instantaneously to the actions of their rivals. If we compare the optimal stopping time in
a setting without leniency and the equilibrium of the preemption game with leniency we can
conclude that for any positive discount rate the optimal time of simultaneous self-reporting in
case of leniency is more likely to be greater than the optimal stopping time, which maximizes
the individual payoﬀ when leniency is not available. To be more precise, due to discontinuity
result of the model with ﬁxed penalty, in case of leniency the outcome of inﬁnitely lasting
cartel is more likely than outcome of immediate simultaneous self-reporting compared to the
benchmark case. These results are summarized in the following proposition.
12The proof of proposition 2 is available from the author upon request.
21Proposition 5 Consider the situation where the penalty is ﬁxed and (λ − r
2)Fn < πm
2 <λ Fn.
In the setting without leniency both ﬁrms report at t∗
1 = t∗
2 =0 . However, if we consider the
equilibrium of the game with leniency, immediate self-reporting does not occur: both ﬁrms report
at Tc = t∗
c →∞ .
Proof: See Appendix 4.
So, with a ﬁx e dp e n a l t ys c h e m e ,e v e ni nt h ep r e s e n c eo fl e n i e n c y ,t h ee ﬃciency of deterrence
depends only on the amount of the ﬁne and the probability of law enforcement. Moreover, we
show that, when penalties are ﬁxed and fall below a certain threshold, leniency programs may
well facilitate collusion.
Hence, if we consider the setting where self-reporting is not possible, we can conclude that
the cartel formation stops immediately, at the beginning of the planning horizon, only when the
penalty is ﬁxed and high enough to outweigh the expected beneﬁts from collusion. However,
in case when government introduces leniency even the expected penalty, which is greater than
instantaneous gains from price-ﬁxing, together with leniency cannot ensure immediate success
of the leniency programs. Only condition πm
2 ≤ (λ − r
2)Fn which implies λFn > πm
2 + r
2Fn,
can ensure immediate self-reporting in case ﬁrms take into account possibility of leniency and
able to react instantaneously to the actions of their rivals. So, when penalties are ﬁxed, the
introduction of leniency programs would reduce the eﬀectiveness of antitrust enforcement. This
implies that the authority will have to increase either the amount of the penalty or the rate of law
enforcement in order to achieve whistle-blowing by both ﬁrms immediately in the beginning
of the planning horizon. Otherwise, when the penalty is low, Fn < πm
2λ−r, introduction of
leniency makes the cartel more stable. This is a very surprising result, since intuitively leniency
should increase the incentives for ﬁrms to betray the cartel and, hence, reduce cartel stability.
However, when the penalty is low, and does not depend on the amount of illegal gains, it may
be the case that the reduced (as a consequence of leniency) net expected ﬁne is, actually, less
than the instantaneous gains from price-ﬁxing, and this drives the result
227E ﬀects of leniency in the model of dynamic price competition
and ”tacit collusion”
In this section we study the eﬀects of leniency programs on the behavior of the ﬁrms in the model
of dynamic price competition where "tacit collusion” may arise13. In the previous sections the
situation of a formalized cartel was considered. In particular, we analyzed the model where
there is formal cartel agreement. This can be discovered by the antitrust authority and punished
on the basis of oﬃcial documents, which provide evidence of illegal price-ﬁxing agreement.
However, it is often the case that ﬁrms do not form an explicit cartel, but sustain high prices
by means of ”tacit collusion”, which harms consumers. This is also an illegal activity and can
be punished according to the Articles 81 of the EC Treaty. Recall, for example, the Soda-Ash
case. In that case the Commission decided that tacit collusion between ICI, a British company,
and Solvay, a Belgian company, was an infringement of Article 81 (ex-85). The Commission
motivated the decision by the fact that the term "concerted practices" mentioned in Article
81 among the prohibited practices also covered the case of tacit collusion between these two
companies.
The situation of ”tacit collusion” assumes that when there is no formal agreement between 2
ﬁrms, but they still keep prices above competitive level, both of them have incentives to undercut
and obtain monopoly proﬁts. Hence, this situation involves the possibility of unercutting. This
special feature makes this case diﬀerent from the assumptions of the preemption game described
above14.
Hence, in this section we incorporate the possibility of undercutting into the model of
leniency without instantaneous reaction15. So, we consider the game between two symmetric
ﬁrms that may cooperate, charge the monopoly price, and obtain half of the monopoly proﬁts in
the industry, πm
2 , each period. However, there is a threat that this violation will be discovered
by antitrust authority. There are two other options for the ﬁrms: self-reporting or undercutting.
The second option is to self-report to the authority and obtain leniency (reduction of the ﬁne).
13See, e.g., Tirole (1988) ”The Theory of Industrial Organization” chapter 6.
14In the case of explicit cartel undercutting is not so easy but also possible. In addition, in case of explicit
cartel in order to sustain an agreement there should be no possibility of renegotiation. So, if we assume that
renegotiation is either impossible or very costly, then we can include additional strategy in the form of "possibility
of undercutting" in the model of explicit collusion as well.
15Clearly, the model of dynamic price competition and ”tacit collusion”, as it is described in Tirole (1988)
rests on the assumption that instantaneous reaction is not possible.
23The third option is to undercut and obtain monopoly proﬁts, πm, for one or more periods. We
also assume that after one of the ﬁrms betrayed and another ﬁrm discovers it, collusion stops
forever. We deﬁne here an information lag, which delays the punishment phase and allows the
ﬁrm to enjoy extra proﬁts for several periods, by ε. This setup gives us a number of interesting
results that diﬀer from the model where undercutting is not possible. We can summarize these
results in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The feedback equilibria of the game with proportional penalty are
immediate stopping, i.e. (t∗
1,t ∗
2)=( 0 ,0), if αλ > 2r − rerε
or cartel forever, i.e. (t∗
1,t ∗
2)=( ∞,∞), if αλ ≤ 2r − rerε.
We refrain here from presenting the proof of this proposition, since it uses the same methods
as the proof of proposition 1. We sketch the main arguments of the proof here. First, we describe
the objective function of the ﬁrm that chooses undercutting option. If the ﬁrm 1 decides to
undercut at instant T, it obtains half of cartel proﬁts, πm
2 , from initial period till T and full
monopoly rents, πm,f r o mT till T + ε. At instant T + ε, the second ﬁrm discovers that ﬁrm
1 betrayed cartel and, hence, collusion stops forever. However, there is a threat of expected
punishment throughout periods 0 to T + ε. Hence, the value of undercutting at instant T is
















2 − λαw(t))e−rtdt. Clearly, the value of undercutting intersects the value of
self-reporting from above in the point where
T+ε R
T




r . This implies that the best option and, hence, the option that is chosen by both




r is the undercutting option, if an









2 −λαw(t))e−rtdt, being the value








2 − λαw(t))e−rtdt, will be compared to the value of the inﬁnitely lasting cartel16.
16See proof of Propsition 1.
The complete proof of proposition 6 is available from author upon request.
24Proposition 6 states that in the preemption game with leniency, where ﬁrms illegally ﬁx
the prices above competitive level and can undercut each other, the no collusion (or immediate
stopping) outcome arises when coeﬃcient of expected penalty, αλ, is greater than 2r − rerε.
Now, if we compare the result of proposition 6 to the result of proposition 1, we can conclude
that, since r>2r−rerε for any r ∈ (0,1), the possibility of undercutting improves the result: a
smaller expected penalty, αλ > 2r − rerε, insures immediate stopping compared to the model
where only self-reporting option is available to the ﬁrms. Hence, the antitrust authority has to
put less eﬀorts into control in order to achieve the outcome of complete deterrence. This result
is also quite intuitive, since the possibility of undercutting increases the incentives for the ﬁrms
to betray the cartel and, hence, reduces the stability of price-ﬁxing agreements.
Another interesting observation is connected with the inﬂuence of the size of the information
lag in case of undercutting on the stability of cartel agreement. From Proposition 6 it follows
that the bigger the ε (information lag) the easier for antitrust authority to block the violation,
since a smaller expected penalty insures immediate stopping. Moreover, for ε>ln2
r collusion
will never arise in equilibrium. This can be explained by the fact that, when information lag
is bigger the cartel is less stable due to the fact that undercutting brings beneﬁts for longer
period and, hence, it is a more attractive option.
8 Conclusions
The main problem addressed in this paper is how leniency programs inﬂuence the stability
of cartels under two diﬀerent regimes of ﬁnes. First, we study the eﬀects of leniency in case
the penalty is an increasing function of the accumulated illegal gains from price-ﬁxing to the
ﬁrm. Next, we look at the case where the penalty is ﬁxed. We denote the former system by
proportional penalty scheme. The enforcement problem we study has several ingredients. We
analyze the design of self-reporting incentives, having a group of (and not a single) defendants.
Moreover, we consider a dynamic setup, where accumulated beneﬁts and losses from crime are
taken into account.
For this purpose we use the tools of optimal stopping and timing games. In particular,
the preemption game is studied in order to identify the advantages of being the leader in the
race to the court game between the members of the existing cartel after the introduction of
leniency programs. The approach, we use, is based on the Reiganum-Fudenberg-Tirole model,
who applied timing games to a technology adoption problem. We apply a similar procedure to
25a cartel formation game between two ﬁrms in the presence of leniency programs, which allows
taking into account the possibility to inﬂuence the internal stability of the cartel.
Comparison of results in the situations with and without leniency suggests that antitrust
enforcement after introduction of leniency programs is more eﬃcient than in the absence of
leniency. Hence, leniency improves upon the situation without leniency.
We also obtain that in the settings with strictly conﬁdential procedure of application for
leniency, i.e. where ﬁrms cannot react instantaneously to the actions of their rivals, the equi-
librium outcome of the preemption game is immediate self-reporting by both ﬁrms at the be-
ginning of the planning horizon in case the expected penalty is suﬃciently high (but still below
the threshold of the model where instantaneous reaction is possible). This implies that strict
leniency programs unambiguously increase the eﬃciency of antitrust enforcement and reduce
cartel stability. The reason is that the impossibility to react instantaneously to the actions
of the rival increases expected future losses in case the cartel is revealed. This happens due
to the fact that it is no longer possible for the follower to obtain reduction of the ﬁne from
simultaneous self-reporting. Hence, we conclude that if the rules of leniency programs are more
strict and the procedure of application for leniency is more conﬁdential, cartel occurrence is
less likely.
We ﬁnd that in most cases leniency reduces duration of cartel agreements but this result is
not unambiguous. In case leniency programs are not too strict and ﬁnes are proportional to the
accumulated illegal gains from price-ﬁxing the result is as follows. Under strict antitrust en-
forcement17, the possibility to self-report and be exempted from the ﬁne increases the incentives
for the ﬁrms to stop cartel formation, and, hence, reduces the duration of cartels. However,
when penalties and rate of law enforcement are low, introduction of leniency programs may, on
the contrary, facilitate collusion.
Under a ﬁxed penalty scheme, even in the presence of leniency, the eﬃciency of deterrence
depends only on the amount of the ﬁne and the probability of law enforcement. Moreover, we
have shown that in some cases, when penalties are ﬁxed and fall below a certain threshold, less
strict leniency programs facilitate collusion.
Another interesting conclusion comes from a numerical comparison of the eﬃciency of an-
titrust enforcement under proportional penalty in the absence of the leniency programs and
after introduction of leniency. In the earlier case we do not observe the outcome of complete
deterrence in the beginning of the planning horizon for any relevant (from the legislation point
17Here by strict antitrust enforcement we mean high ﬁns and rate of law enforcement.
26of view) parameter values, whereas after the introduction of leniency programs this result be-
comes unambiguous for suﬃciently high (but still in the range of legally acceptable) values of
the scale parameter of the penalty scheme.
T h ee x t e n s i o no ft h em o d e ls t u d i e st h ee ﬀects of leniency programs on the behavior of
the ﬁrms in the model of dynamic price competition and ”tacit collusion”, where ﬁrms can
undercut each other in prices. The result of this model implies that in the environments where
undercutting is possible it is easier for competition authority to prevent price-ﬁxing, since a
smaller expected penalty insures immediate stopping. This implies that the antitrust authority
has to put less eﬀorts into control in order to achieve the result of complete deterrence.
Another interesting extension would be to introduce asymmetric ﬁrms into the model. They
may diﬀer either through marginal costs parameter or size. This will inﬂuence the outcome
of the game dramatically. This extension would make the model much closer to real world
situation but solution of dynamic games with asymmetric information it not a trivial task.
9 Appendixes
9.1 Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 1
Let the penalty be proportional to the accumulated illegal gains from cartel formation s(t)=
αw(t). In this case two possible outcomes can arise depending on the parameters of the model.
Either both ﬁrms report the cartel simultaneously in the beginning of the game or the cartel
will last forever.
1. Consider the case αλ ≤ r.





can be rewritten as π = πm
2r (1 − αλ




2r e−rt). Hence, given αλ ≤ r, we obtain π>L (t) for all t ∈ [0,∞).
This implies that the matrix game played at each instant t, which has been described in section
4.1, has two pure strategy Nash Equilibria, and the equilibrium (N,N)t Pareto dominates
(S,S)t for all t ∈ [0,∞). This implies that, when αλ ≤ r the unique SPNE of the dynamic
game is (N,N)t for all t ∈ [0,∞). Hence, (t∗
1,t ∗
2)=( ∞,∞) is the unique feedback equilibrium
of the preemption game if αλ ≤ r.
The above considerations imply that in case αλ ≤ r the cartel will last forever, and self-
reporting is never a dominant strategy for any of the ﬁrms. See also Figure 1 above in section
5.2.
27E n do ft h ep r o o fo fp a r t1.
2. Consider the setting with αλ > r. Two possible sub-cases can arise here.
a) π<0 ,s ot h a tπ<L (t) for all t ∈ [0,∞) T h i sc a nh o l do n l yi f αλ > 2r. See Figure 3.
b) π<L (t) for some t ∈ [0,∞) holds when r<α λ<2r. This situation is depicted in
Figure 2.
In both cases the dominant strategy for each ﬁrm is to play St at each instant of time.
This implies that (t∗
1,t ∗
2)=( 0 ,0) is the unique feedback equilibrium of the preemption game if
αλ > r.
We prove this statement by backward induction.
W ec a ns h o wt h a ti nb o t hc a s e s , αλ > 2r and r<α λ<2r, the function L(t) approaches
π from above when t tends to inﬁnity, i.e. there exists a ﬁnite number b t such that L(t) >π
for all t>b t, 18 where b t satisﬁes L(t) − π =0 . This implies that b t =
ln( αλ
2(αλ−r))
r . It is clearly
ﬁnite for any ﬁnite values of α, λ and r when αλ > r. Moreover, it is easily veriﬁed that
L(t) − π = −πm
2r e−rt(1 − αλ
r + αλ
2r e−rt) > 0 for all t>b t.
Since M(t) >F(t) for all t ∈ (0,∞), given sF ∈ (1
2sn,s n] and sm = 1
2sn, and L(t) >π for
t>b t, we can conclude that for both ﬁrms the strategy St (self-report at t) strictly dominates
strategy Nt for all t>b t. Hence, for any t ∈ [b t,∞), there is a unique Nash Equilibrium of
simultaneous move matrix game played at instant t of a dynamic game, which is described by
(S,S)t.
Now we apply the backward induction argument. We look at the matrix game played at
instant t and assume that, if the game continues for one more period, the equilibrium of game
at t+ will be (S,S)t+, since simultaneous self-reporting should be part of the subgame perfect
strategy given the result above. Then the payoﬀ matrix at t will have following form
Self-report Not self-report
Self-report (M(t),M(t)) (L(t),F(t))
Not self-report (F(t),L(t)) (M(t+),M(t+))
By assumption of the model, function L(t) is always above the function M(t) and, hence,
L(t) >M (t+) for any t and t+ ∈ (0,∞). This inequality implies that the strategy St (t o
self-report at t ) is dominant for both ﬁrms. This implies that the matrix game at t has a
unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium : (S,S). Repeating this argument backwards to the
initial period of the game, and taking into account the fact that L(t) >M (t+) for any t,
t+ ∈ (0,∞), we obtain that self-reporting is a dominant strategy for both players at each
18Recall Figure 2 and Figure 3.
28instant of time. Consequently, immediate simultaneous self-reporting at t =0is a SPNE of the
inﬁnitely repeated game. And, hence, (t∗
1,t ∗
2)=( 0 ,0) is the unique feedback equilibrium of the
preemption game when αλ > r.
In other words, when αλ > r, both ﬁrms want to become leader and report at TL =
argmaxL(t). As a result a ﬁrm will try to preempt the other ﬁrm by reporting at time TL −ε.
But then the other will try to preempt by reporting at TL − 2ε and so forth and so on. This
process stops at time t =0 , where both values L(t) and F(t) are equal.
E n do ft h ep r o o fo fp a r t2 .
End of proof of proposition 1.
9.2 Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 2
P r o o fo fl e m m a2 :
First , we reformulate expressions (14) and (15) in order to make them comparable. The


























(αλ − r)(2αλ − 2r − rα)
(20)
It is clear that expression (20) is negative when r<α λ<2r. This implies that Tc >T L
when r<α λ<2r.
In case 2r<α λ expression (20) becomes strictly positive and, consequently, we obtain that
TL >T c when 2r<α λ.
End of the proof.
9.3 Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 3
If the leader reports at time TL, then the best response of the follower, given the possibility
to react instantaneously, is to report at time TL as well. But this means simultaneous self-
reporting and, consequently, the payoﬀsf o rb o t hﬁrms will be M(TL), w h i c hi sl e s st h a nM(Tc)
by deﬁnition. So, the rational leader will anticipate this and take into account this best response
of the follower. Consequently, his optimal strategy would be to wait until Tc a n dt h e nb o t h
ﬁrms report simultaneously at time Tc.
Here (t∗
1,t ∗
2)=( Tc,T c) is a feedback equilibrium of the preemption game with leniency, since
no one of the ﬁrms has incentives to deviate either by waiting with self-reporting till t>T c
or by preempting the other ﬁrm by playing t<T c. In both cases, given the assumption that
29ﬁrms can react instantaneously and, hence, the second ﬁrm will also self-report immediately
after the ﬁrst ﬁrm does so, both ﬁrms obtain lower payoﬀs: M(t) <M(Tc) for any t 6= Tc, since
by deﬁnition Tc =a r gm a x t≥0 M(t).
End of the proof.
Note, that this result holds only under assumptions that ﬁrms are completely symmet-
ric and can react instantaneously to the actions of their opponents. In case when we relax
the assumption that ﬁrms can react instantaneously, the feedback equilibrium of the game is
(t1,t 2)=( 0 ,0) if αλ > r or cartel forever, i.e. (t1,t 2)=( ∞,∞) if αλ < r.
9.4 Appendix 4: Proof of proposition 5
To prove the result of proposition 5, we ﬁrst derive the optimal stopping time for the ﬁrm when
there is no leniency and the optimal stopping time in case of simultaneous self-reporting with
leniency in the setting where the penalty is ﬁxed.
Following the result of the benchmark model, we obtain that the optimal stopping time in









In the game with leniency, following the reasoning similar to Proposition 3, we conclude
that (t1,t 2)=( Tc,T c) is a feedback equilibrium of the preemption game with leniency, where
Tc =a r gm a x t≥0 M(t). In this case the ﬁrms have no incentives to deviate either by waiting
with self-reporting till t>T c or by preempting the other ﬁrm by playing t<T c. In both
cases, given the assumption that ﬁrms can react instantaneously and, hence, the second ﬁrm
will also self-report immediately after the ﬁrst ﬁrm does so, both ﬁrms obtain lower payoﬀs:
M(t) <M(Tc) for any t 6= Tc.











Next, we derive exact formulas for the feedback equilibrium of the game with leniency
where the penalty is ﬁxed. Recall the game described in Table 1. The outcome, i.e. whether
(S,S) or (N,N) will occur, depends on the magnitude of gains from cartel formation and the
expected ﬁne. Maximizing expression (22) with respect to time we conclude that Tc →∞ if
30πm
2 > (λ − r
2)Fn and Tc =0 if πm
2 ≤ (λ − r
2)Fn.H e n c e , (S,S)t with t =0is a SPNE when
πm
2 ≤ (λ − r
2)Fn , while (N,N)t is a SPNE for all t ∈ [0,∞) when πm
2 > (λ − r
2)Fn. We
conclude that, two outcomes can arise as an equilibrium in feedback strategies: one is immediate
self-reporting at Tc =0 , i.e. (t∗
1,t ∗
2)=( 0 ,0) and the other equilibrium is never self-report, i.e.
Tc →∞ , so that (t∗
1,t ∗
2)=( ∞,∞).
End of the proof.
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